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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Petitioner, a German resident, appeals the denial of his 
petition alleging that his wife wrongfully retained their then-
eight-year-old son in the United States in violation of the 
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
                                              
1 We express our gratitude to Appellant’s counsel for 
accepting our appointment of this matter and for their 
excellent briefing and argument in this case.  Lawyers who 
act pro bono fulfill the highest service that members of the 
bar can offer to indigent parties and to the legal profession. 
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Abduction.  Because we conclude that, to the extent an 
agreement between the parties can be gleaned from the 
record, the parents’ shared intent was that the child would 
move to the United States not for a transient visit, but with a 
settled purpose, and because the child had acclimatized to his 
life in the United States at the time of the retention, the 
United States was then his habitual residence and the 
retention was not wrongful under the Convention.  
Accordingly, we will affirm. 
I. Factual Background  
A.  J.B.’s Early Years and Initial Two-Year 
Residence in Pittsburgh 
 J.B., a United States citizen, was born in the Ukraine 
in 2008 to Petitioner Charles Blackledge, a United States 
citizen who currently resides in Berlin, Germany, and 
Respondent Olga Blackledge, a Ukrainian citizen and lawful 
permanent resident of the United States who currently resides 
in Pittsburgh, United States.  For the first three years of J.B.’s 
life, the family lived in Kharkiv, Ukraine, and Dublin, 
Ireland, while also spending some weeks in Vilnius, 
Lithuania.  In the spring of 2011, when the family was staying 
in Lithuania and then Ukraine, Petitioner secured a job as a 
patent agent in Germany at about the same time Respondent 
was accepted to a Ph.D. program at the University of 
Pittsburgh.  The family left Ukraine and, after a seven-week 
summer holiday in Munich, Germany, Respondent and J.B. 
moved to Pittsburgh and lived for the next two years 
separately from Petitioner, who lived and worked in Berlin, 
Germany, while regularly visiting and communicating with 
J.B.  According to Petitioner, the plan was for the family to 
eventually reunite—either Respondent would finish her 
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coursework in Pittsburgh and go to Germany or Petitioner 
would use his position in Germany “as a stepping stone to get 
back to the [United States].”  J.A. 240. 
 In the summer of 2013, after Respondent and J.B. had 
lived in Pittsburgh for two years, J.B. underwent cardiac 
surgery at the Children’s Hospital in Pittsburgh.  Petitioner 
went to Pittsburgh to be with J.B. during his recuperation and 
to seek jobs in the United States.  When those efforts proved 
fruitless, Petitioner decided to return to Germany and 
Respondent agreed to join him, both because she had agreed, 
before the initial move to Pittsburgh, to move to Germany for 
two years and because she was financially unable to support 
herself at that point.  Respondent then arranged for storage of 
toys, books, furniture, and other belongings with a friend in 
Pittsburgh, and Petitioner, Respondent, and J.B. moved 
together to Berlin, Germany, in August 2013.  For J.B., this 
was the first time he had ever been to Berlin or ever resided in 
Germany. 
B. J.B.’s Move to Germany 
 After the move, Respondent continued to pursue her 
Ph.D. studies at the University of Pittsburgh, remotely, and 
J.B. was enrolled in the J.F.K. School, a public school 
“founded in conjunction [with the] American Embassy and 
German Government” with a “bilingual/bicultural” focus, 
intending to provide American students with an “easier time 
to adjust to the[ir] German” residency while still 
“preserv[ing] their language and continu[ing] to work on their 
language skills and all of the subjects in English.”  J.A. 430-
31.  J.B. also attended an afterschool program at J.F.K., where 
students could play and do their homework, joined a soccer 
team, and played chess at the Russian House.   
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In August 2015, when J.B. was seven years old, 
Respondent sought to return to Pittsburgh to complete the 
final phase of her Ph.D. program.  By this point, according to 
both parties, the marriage had become acrimonious, and, 
according to Respondent, they had “agreed that [they would] 
divorce” and that it was only “a matter of time [as to] when.”  
J.A. 421-22.  While the nature of the parties’ disagreement 
over J.B.’s continued residence underlies this appeal and will 
be discussed in more detail below, Petitioner initially agreed 
that Respondent and J.B. would return to Pittsburgh, and they 
requested a one-year leave of absence for J.B. from the J.F.K. 
School and secured German visas for themselves and J.B. that 
were valid through 2018.  Given the belongings they had 
stored in Pittsburgh in August 2013, Respondent and J.B. 
opted to leave in Germany items that were difficult to 
transport, such as toys, Legos, and a bike, when they returned 
to Pittsburgh in August 2015.   
C. J.B.’s Return to Pittsburgh 
Back in Pittsburgh, J.B. attended second grade in the 
2015-2016 school year and, according to his teacher, 
“performed as a wonderful second grader,” earning, 
cumulatively, at the end of the year As in spelling, 
handwriting, math, and grammar, and a B in reading, and 
finishing the year on “academic high honor roll.”  J.A. 328-
30.  J.B.’s teacher described him as a “well-behaved” child 
who “followed rules and routines easily,” “made friends 
easily,” J.A. 330, was “[k]ind, happy, loving, eager to learn,” 
and was generally “well-adjusted,” J.A. 334.  Despite an 
initial deficiency in reading, J.B. finished the fourth quarter 
with “an excellent grade,” showing what his teacher termed 
“dramatic improvement” in his reading level throughout the 
year.  J.A. 333, 451.  J.B.’s love of reading extended beyond 
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the school year, when J.B. joined a summer reading 
challenge, completing the fifteen-book assignment by July 5, 
two months ahead of the August 31 deadline.   
J.B. was also a member of a four-student robotics club, 
organized by a parent of one of his classmates.  The team met 
every Saturday or Sunday afternoon when the students would 
design missions and submit the mission to a robotics 
competition, winning first place in Pennsylvania and twenty-
ninth in the United States.  J.B. was tentative at first, because 
he didn’t know how to program the robot and thought the 
tasks were “impossible,” but by the end “he was . . . so 
excited” by the project, and he was able to explain his 
favorite mission and how the students accomplished it.  J.A. 
355-56.  J.B. and the classmate whose mother had organized 
the robotics club “stayed friends after the robotic project” 
ended, playing Legos and soccer together.  J.A. 358. 
In addition, J.B. bonded with his teammates on his 
swim team, which ran for three trimesters—from September 
through December, January through April, and May through 
July.  The goal for students on the team was to master the 
four competitive strokes so that they would be able to do 
them “correctly if they decide[d] to compete.”  J.A. 369-70.  
At the start of the year, J.B. was “able to swim the length of 
the pool free style” and had “a pretty good breast stroke kick, 
but his endurance—swimming the length of the pool was 
difficult.”  J.A. 371.  By spring, however, he was able to 
compete in four meets, “better[ing] his times pretty much 
every meet” and, by summer, “he was able to swim all four 
strokes,” do “flip turns,” and “dive.”  J.A. 371-72.   
J.B. made many friends in Pittsburgh and enjoyed play 
dates, birthday parties, video-gaming, playing soccer, playing 
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card games, sleepovers, and other outings with various young 
people.  J.B.’s own birthday party, when he turned eight in 
June 2016, was attended by many of those friends.  
Respondent’s friends and colleagues also developed a bond 
with J.B., enjoying dinners together, attending university 
events and spending weekends and holidays together, going 
to the park, attending theater festivals and puppet shows 
together, and generally playing with and babysitting J.B.     
Respondent and J.B. also explored the broader 
Pittsburgh environs, including trips to Erie, Pennsylvania, 
Frank Lloyd Wright’s Fallingwater in Mill Run, 
Pennsylvania, and Pittsburgh’s four Carnegie Museums.  
They also became members of a local museum called the 
Mattress Factory where J.B. enjoyed “showing off his 
knowledge . . . to his friends,” whom he sometimes invited to 
join him.  J.A. 446-47.  J.B.’s interests extended as well to 
sports, and he became familiar with the local sports teams and 
was a fan of the Pittsburgh Penguins hockey team and the 
Riverhounds soccer team.   
D. Parents’ Dispute Over J.B.’s Continued 
Residence 
Within the first month of J.B.’s stay in the United 
States, Petitioner sent Respondent an email, referencing job 
applications he had sent to the United States and elsewhere, 
and indicating that he might be moving to another country so 
that J.B. would not be returning to Germany at all.  
Respondent assured Petitioner that J.B. “is pretty happy in 
Pittsburgh, so by the end of the year, going back to Berlin 
might not be exactly what he wants.”  J.A. 199.  Petitioner 
replied to this email but did not comment on, or reject, the 
possibility of J.B. remaining in Pittsburgh.   
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However, five months later, in February 2016, 
Petitioner initiated a series of emails with Respondent that 
form the bulk of the record of the parties’ shared intent as to 
J.B.’s habitual residence.  These began with Petitioner’s 
request that Respondent “confirm [her] commitment to our 
agreement” that J.B. would return to Germany for the 2016-
17 academic year.  J.A. 188-90.  For her part, the Respondent 
did not deny the existence of an agreement but asked the 
Petitioner to “reconsider it,” J.A. 172, explaining, “I do not 
think . . . it is a good idea for a child [J.B.’s] age to live with 
one parent for a year, and with the other for a year,” J.A. 181.  
That agreement, Respondent stated, “presupposes . . . yearly 
adaptation to living with different parents [which] is 
psychologically disadvantageous” to J.B., and urged 
Petitioner to consider J.B.’s well-being, J.A. 177, suggesting 
that Petitioner move “somewhere close” so that they could 
both “take care of [J.B.] on a permanent basis” and not 
“change [J.B.’s] permanent caregiver every year.”  J.A. 181.    
 In response, Petitioner observed that Respondent had 
not expressed any concerns about J.B. “spend[ing] alternate 
years with us when the agreement was made.” J.A. 178.  And 
while Petitioner acknowledged Respondent’s “concerns about 
stability of dwelling,” he explained that he did not “think 
there [we]re better options than maintaining [their] previous 
agreement,” J.A. 179 (emphasis omitted), which he 
characterized as: “[J.B.] would go with you to Pitt[sburgh] 
and return to me for 2016-2017 academic year.  Then back to 
you . . . .”  J.A. 176.  In subsequent correspondence, 
Petitioner advised Respondent to “prepare [herself] for 
fulfillment of [the] agreement that [J.B.] returns to 
[Respondent] for 2016-2017,” reassuring her, “You’ll have 
him again in 2017,” J.A. 168.  And in May, the parties again 
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discussed the prospect of J.B. alternating years between his 
parents, with Petitioner documenting in his notes of their call 
that Respondent continued to oppose “any plan for [J.B.] to 
alternate between Germany and [the] USA,” because she 
believed that it “put[] too much pressure on [J.B.] to go back 
and forth” and “insist[ed] upon more consistency.”  J.A. 156-
58.  
 While the dispute between the parties over J.B.’s long-
term residency arrangements was ongoing, Respondent filed 
petitions for divorce and custody and, at the end of May, the 
Family Court in Allegheny County, Pennsylvania issued an 
interim custody order that, in terms of physical custody, 
allowed J.B. to continue to reside with the Respondent, 
pending a final custody determination, and granted Petitioner 
visitation over the summer and holidays.   
On June 9, Petitioner informed Respondent that he had 
found a good rate for J.B. to return to Berlin on June 19 and 
that he wanted J.B. to stay in Berlin and go to school there 
“like we planned.”  J.A. 144.  Respondent objected on the 
grounds that, under the interim custody order, any trip to 
Berlin would only be for a visit, not for the school year, and 
that J.B., in any event, was committed through August 3 to 
attend robotics and other summer camps, which Petitioner 
had not told her to cancel and for which the cancellation 
deadline had then passed.  
Declaring that the interim custody order was “not 
valid,” Petitioner “demand[ed] that [J.B.] return on 19 June,” 
J.A. 143, and reiterated that he was looking at tickets for both 
Respondent and J.B., even though Respondent objected that 
“. . . it sounds like you are planning to abduct [J.B.],” and that 
Petitioner should “contest the court’s decision . . . legal[l]y,” 
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J.A. 143.  After a few additional exchanges in which 
Respondent sought assurance from Petitioner about the length 
of J.B.’s visit before she would consent to his return to 
Germany, Petitioner stated that he was “still waiting to hear 
anything more from the mediators.”  J.A. 140.  The record 
reflects no additional email communications between the 
parties.   
On July 6, 2016, Petitioner filed a petition in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, seeking J.B.’s return to Germany under the 
Hague Convention.   
II. District Court Proceedings 
 The District Court held a two-day bench trial in mid-
August.2  In addition to the above-referenced emails and the 
testimony of Petitioner and Respondent, the trial record 
included testimony and documentation offered by J.B.’s 
teacher, swim coach, parents of J.B.’s school friends, and 
Respondent’s friends, related to J.B.’s acclimatization to 
Pittsburgh, as well as written statements from Petitioner’s 
brother and friends and acquaintances in Germany, indicating 
they understood that J.B. was to return to Germany for the 
                                              
2 Prior to the hearing, the parties were referred to 
mediation.  Unfortunately, mediation was unsuccessful.  
While mediation enables parents, who are well-positioned to 
know the needs of their child, to forge a resolution that best 
serves the child’s interests, a court reviewing a Hague 
Convention petition has the more limited mandate of 
“restor[ing] the status quo that existed prior to the wrongful . . 
. retention.”  Didon v. Dominguez Castillo, 838 F.3d 313, 320 
(3d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
11 
 
2016-2017 school year.  With regard to the testimony of 
Petitioner and Respondent, the District Court found 
Respondent generally to be more credible.  Of the written 
statements offered by Petitioner, only one was based on a 
conversation in which Respondent was present, and the rest 
were based on Petitioner’s representations to the declarants.  
The District Court accorded these statements “diminished 
weight” and “minimal significance,” on the grounds that they 
were “the product of a concerted effort by Petitioner” and that 
“several” of the letters “merely . . . parrot[ed] language 
directly suggested by Petitioner.” Blackledge v. Blackledge, 
No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *22 (W.D. 
Pa. Aug. 26, 2016).  The District Court also conducted an in 
camera interview of J.B.   
On August 19, 2016, the District Court entered an 
order denying the petition, and on August 26, 2016, it issued 
a Memorandum Opinion in support of its order.3  See id. at 
*1.  Its first order of business was to determine the retention 
date so that it could then consider which forum was J.B.’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to that date.  Reasoning 
                                              
3 Because the District Court concluded Petitioner did 
not meet his burden to prove he was entitled to relief, it did 
not address any of the affirmative defenses raised by 
Respondent, which included that J.B. had attained the age and 
maturity at which it was appropriate to take account of his 
preferences, that J.B. preferred to remain in Pittsburgh, and 
that returning to Germany would expose J.B. to a grave risk 
of harm.  See Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 
International Child Abduction art. 13, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. 
No. 11,670; Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
114543, at *7-15.   
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that Petitioner himself testified he originally agreed to permit 
J.B. to live in Pittsburgh for one year, starting in August 
2015, and that Petitioner had acquiesced to J.B. participating 
in camps through the summer, the District Court calculated 
the retention date as August 2016.  Id. at *10-11 & n.5.   
Turning to the question of habitual residence, the 
District Court correctly recognized that it was required to 
consider both the parents’ shared intent and the child’s 
acclimatization.  Id. at *11-12; see Karkkainen v. Kovalchuk, 
445 F.3d 280, 291-92 (3d Cir. 2006).  As to shared parental 
intent, it concluded there was “no credible evidence” that the 
parties agreed that J.B.’s stay would be for a “specific 
duration.”  Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
114543, at *24.  And, considering evidence of J.B.’s activities 
and expectations up until the August retention date, the Court 
concluded that J.B. was acclimatized to Pittsburgh.  Id. at 
*12-17, *24.  In so finding, it accorded “significant weight” 
to J.B.’s in camera interview, including his stated preference 
for Pittsburgh, because it found J.B. “to exhibit an unusual 
degree of maturity and situational awareness.”  Id. at *12 n.6, 
*15.  As it concluded Pittsburgh was J.B.’s habitual residence 
immediately prior to the August retention date, the District 
Court held that the retention was not wrongful under the 
Hague Convention.  Id. at *25.  The consequence of this 
holding was that J.B. could continue to reside in Pittsburgh 
pending the resolution of his parents’ custody proceedings 
before the Allegheny County Family Court.  See generally 
Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287. 
Petitioner now appeals, seeking to reverse the District 
Court’s denial of his petition, with the understanding that a 
reversal would allow the Allegheny County interim custody 
order to be vacated, custody proceedings to be initiated in 
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Germany, and J.B. to reside with Petitioner in Germany 
pending the resolution of those proceedings.   
III. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court properly exercised jurisdiction 
under 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a), which grants district courts 
original jurisdiction over claims arising under the 
Convention.  We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
We review the District Court’s factual findings for 
clear error and review legal conclusions and the application of 
the law to the facts de novo.  Didon v. Dominguez Castillo, 
838 F.3d 313, 319-20 & n.13 (3d Cir. 2016).  In the context 
of Hague Convention cases, certain determinations involve 
mixed questions of law and fact.  We have held, for example, 
that habitual residence is a mixed question of law and fact.  
Feder v. Evans-Feder, 63 F.3d 217, 222 n.9 (3d Cir. 1995).  
And although our past cases have not addressed the issue in 
explicit terms, we recognize today that the two factors 
informing habitual residence, i.e., the parents’ shared 
intentions regarding the child’s move and the child’s 
acclimatization, themselves involve mixed questions, because 
those factors depend both on case-specific fact-findings and 
whether those findings meet the specified legal threshold.  
See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696-97 (1996) 
(explaining that the “issue [of] whether the facts satisfy the 
[relevant legal] standard” is a mixed question of law and 
fact).  For mixed questions of law and fact, we must “separate 
the issue into its respective parts, applying the clearly 
erroneous test to the factual component, [and] the plenary 
standard to the legal.”  N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA 
Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995). 
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IV. Analysis 
 The purposes of the Hague Convention are “to secure 
the prompt return of children wrongfully removed to or 
retained in any Contracting State” and “to ensure the rights of 
custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State 
are effectively respected in the other Contracting States.”  
Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child 
Abduction art. 1, Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11,670 
[hereinafter Hague Convention].  The Convention was “not 
designed to resolve international custody disputes.”  
Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287.  Rather, in addressing Hague 
Convention petitions, courts are limited “to restor[ing] the 
status quo prior to any wrongful removal or retention, and to 
deter[ring] parents from engaging in international forum 
shopping in custody cases.”  Id; see also Didon, 838 F.3d at 
320 (explaining that any return remedy merely “seeks to 
restore the status quo that existed prior to the wrongful . . . 
retention” (internal quotation marks omitted)).   
 A petitioner who initiates judicial proceedings for the 
return of a child under the Hague Convention has the burden 
to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the child 
has been wrongfully removed or retained.  22 U.S.C. § 
9003(b), (e)(1)(A).  The removal or retention of a child is 
wrongful if:  
a  it is in breach of rights of custody attributed to a 
person . . . under the law of the State in which 
the child is habitually resident immediately 
before the removal or retention; and  
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b  at the time of removal or retention those rights 
were actually exercised . . . or would have been 
so exercised but for the removal or retention.   
Hague Convention, supra, art. 3.  As we have explained in 
interpreting these provisions, to determine if a petitioner is 
entitled to relief, the court must answer four questions: “(1) 
when the removal or retention took place; (2) the child’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to such removal or 
retention; (3) whether the removal or retention breached the 
petitioner’s custody rights under the law of the child’s 
habitual residence; and (4) whether the petitioner was 
exercising his or her custody rights at the time of removal or 
retention.”  Yang v. Tsui, 499 F.3d 259, 271 (3d Cir. 2007) 
(citing Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 287).  
Here, as the District Court observed, there was no 
dispute as to the fourth factor, i.e., that Petitioner had custody 
rights under German law and that he was exercising those 
rights.  But, having determined that the retention date was 
August 2016 and that J.B.’s habitual residence immediately 
prior to that date was Pittsburgh, the District Court concluded, 
on the basis of the first two factors, that Petitioner had not 
met his burden of proving a wrongful retention.4  Blackledge, 
No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *10, *25. 
 Below we address, first, Petitioner’s argument that the 
District Court erred in fixing the retention date, and, second, 
                                              
4 As to the third factor, Petitioner made no argument 
that the retention breached his custody rights under United 
States or German law.  Instead, his argument focused on 
whether Germany still remained J.B.’s habitual residence at 
the time of the retention.   
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Petitioner’s contention that it erred in determining J.B.’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to that date.   
A. Retention Date 
 According to Petitioner, the District Court erred in 
adopting August 2016 as the retention date because Petitioner 
had withdrawn his consent to J.B. remaining in the United 
States prior to August, when he had “clearly communicate[d] 
[his] desire to regain custody” of J.B. in the June 9 email 
demanding J.B.’s return by June 19.  Appellant’s Br. 21-22 
(second alteration in original) (quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d 
at 290).  Respondent, for her part, urges us to adopt the 
District Court’s August date.  We conclude neither June nor 
August reflects the proper date under our case law.   
In Karkkainen we confronted a situation where the 
noncustodial parent initially agreed to the child remaining in 
the United States indefinitely, but then, in mid-July, emailed 
the custodial parent demanding that the child return home on 
August 10, the date for which she had purchased a return 
flight for the child, insisting that retention beyond that date 
would “constitute kidnapping.” 445 F.3d at 289-90.  In 
determining the retention date, we recited, without adopting, 
another court’s definition of “retention date” as the date the 
noncustodial parent “clearly communicates her desire to 
regain custody and asserts her parental right to have [her 
child] live with her.”  Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis 
omitted) (quoting Slagenweit v. Slagenweit, 841 F. Supp. 264, 
270 (N.D. Iowa 1993)).  Assuming this definition applied, we 
held that by mid-July the noncustodial parent had clearly 
communicated the withdrawal of consent for the child to 
remain in the United States beyond August 10 and that 
nothing in the record “suggest[ed] there was confusion about 
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[the noncustodial parent’s] opposition after mid-July.”  Id. at 
290.  While we acknowledged that the noncustodial parent 
had originally agreed to let the child remain in the United 
States indefinitely, id. at 289, and had communicated in mid-
July her withdrawal of that consent beyond August 10, we did 
not adopt the mid-July notice date as the retention date, id. at 
290.  Nor did we accept the notion that the original agreement 
for a longer period vitiated the noncustodial parent’s ability to 
clearly communicate her desire to regain custody of the child.  
Id.  Instead, we recognized that a party may accelerate a 
retention date by “withdraw[ing] her consent to have [the 
child] remain” with the custodial parent, and we then settled 
on August 10—i.e., the date on which consent actually 
expired—as the retention date.  Id. at 290-91.   
Building on Karkkainen, we hold that the retention 
date is the date beyond which the noncustodial parent no 
longer consents to the child’s continued habitation with the 
custodial parent and instead seeks to reassert custody rights, 
as clearly and unequivocally communicated through words, 
actions, or some combination thereof.  That determination is, 
by necessity, fact-intensive and will vary with the 
circumstances of each case.  And while in some cases the 
notice date and actual expiration date will coincide, in other 
cases the notice will indicate a future date as the date consent 
will be withdrawn, in which case that latter date, depending 
on the facts of the case, will constitute the expiration date 
and, hence, the retention date.   
In determining the retention date here, we conclude 
that the District Court erred by looking solely to Petitioner’s 
original consent for J.B. to reside in Pittsburgh through 
August 2016 and failing to assess whether Petitioner’s 
subsequent communications, up to and including the filing of 
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his Hague Convention petition, effected a withdrawal of that 
consent.5  But, consistent with Karkkainen, we also reject 
Petitioner’s argument in favor of a June 9, 2016 retention 
date, as that date reflects merely Petitioner’s notice of a 
possible expiration of consent on June 19, 2016.   
While in Karkkainen we rested on the prospective date 
of expiration identified in that petitioner’s notice, id. at 290, 
significant differences between the facts of that case and this 
one lead us to conclude that June 19 also does not reflect the 
proper retention date here.  In Karkkainen the noncustodial 
parent took the affirmative step of purchasing a ticket, 
asserted that any retention beyond the scheduled return date 
would constitute “kidnapping,” and did not equivocate as to 
that retention date.  Id. at 290.  Here, in contrast, Petitioner 
only researched the possibility of purchasing a ticket; 
Respondent, not Petitioner, flagged a concern about 
“abduct[ion],” J.A. 143; and Petitioner left open the 
possibility of further negotiations, stating after his demand 
email that he was “still waiting to hear anything more from 
the mediators,” J.A. 140.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude neither June 9 nor June 19 was the retention date, 
and in the absence of any earlier communication in which 
Petitioner clearly and unequivocally withdrew his prior 
consent and sought to reassert his custody rights, we hold that 
                                              
5 Indeed, given that the District Court purported to 
exercise jurisdiction over this case since the filing of the 
petition on July 6, 2016, an August 2016 retention date would 
raise concerns about the ripeness of Petitioner’s claim and the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to adjudicate it.  See 
generally Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 
U.S. 568, 579-80 (1985). 
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consent expired and J.B. was therefore “retained” on the date 
Petitioner filed his Hague Convention petition, i.e., July 6.   
Below we consider the evidence concerning J.B.’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to that retention date and 
whether the District Court erred in its conclusions as to the 
parents’ shared intent or J.B.’s acclimatization.   
B. Habitual Residence 
 To determine where a child is habitually resident we 
“employ a mixed standard of review, accepting [a] district 
court’s historical or narrative facts unless they are clearly 
erroneous, but exercising plenary review of the court’s choice 
of and interpretation of legal precepts and its application of 
those precepts to the facts.”  Didon, 838 F.3d at 320 n.13 
(alteration in original) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 n.9).  
The Hague Convention does not define habitual residence, 
and we have held that it “is a fact-intensive determination that 
cannot be reduced to a predetermined formula and necessarily 
varies with the circumstances of each case.”  Karkkainen, 445 
F.3d at 291.  That inquiry becomes all the more difficult 
where “the petitioning parent initially agreed to allow the 
child to stay abroad for an indefinite duration, but 
subsequently had second thoughts about that decision.”  Id.  
Although a difficult inquiry, it is not without guideposts and 
our precedent assists us in navigating our path.  Below we 
discuss (1) guiding principles from our case law relevant to 
habitual residence; (2) the record in this case concerning 
shared parental intent; and (3) the evidence of J.B.’s 
acclimatization. 
1.  Principles of Habitual Residence  
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 A child’s habitual residence is “the place where [the 
child] has been physically present for an amount of time 
sufficient for acclimatization and which has a degree of 
settled purpose from the child’s perspective.”  Baxter v. 
Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Feder, 63 F.3d at 224).  To assess 
whether a child’s habitual residence meets this threshold we 
analyze both the child’s acclimatization and the “shared 
parental intent”—a factor that is relevant because “the child’s 
knowledge of [his parents’] intentions is likely to color [his] 
attitude to the contacts [he] is making” and “affect the length 
of time necessary for a child to become habitually resident or 
otherwise influence a child’s ability to acclimatize,” and, in 
addition, because it bears on the parents’ own intentions 
“regarding their child’s presence in a particular place.”6  
Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292, 296 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).   
As a general matter “courts will find no change in 
habitual residence” where the evidence of shared parental 
intent reflects that the “child’s initial move from an 
established habitual residence was clearly intended to be for a 
specific, limited duration.”   Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 
540, 549 (3d Cir. 2004).  However, we have recognized an 
exception to this general rule where a move, though 
temporary, carries “a degree of settled purpose . . . , even if 
                                              
6 We give some “independent weight to the parents’ 
present, shared intentions” to “ensure that neither parent is 
acting unilaterally to alter a joint understanding reached by 
the parents.”  Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
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such purpose is only for a limited period.”  Id.  The concept 
of “settled purpose,” then, does not require an intention “to 
stay . . . indefinitely,” and may in fact be for a “limited 
period,” precipitated by various motivations, including 
“[e]ducation, business or profession, employment, health, 
family or merely love of the place.”  Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-
24.  Regardless of the motivation for the location selected, or 
whether the stay was meant to be permanent or temporary, 
“[a]ll that is necessary is that the purpose of living where one 
does has a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 
described as settled.”  Id.  
As to the relative weight given the parents’ shared 
intent and the child’s acclimatization, we have held that when 
a child is very young, he “cannot possibly decide the issue of 
residency,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548, and the parents’ shared 
intent is, thus, “of paramount importance,” while 
acclimatization is secondary, Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296.  
However, once a child is old enough “to develop a certain 
routine and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy,” 
acclimatization becomes the central inquiry.  Whiting, 391 
F.3d at 550-51.  Although we have not fixed the age when 
acclimatization takes on this greater significance, and it 
necessarily will vary depending on the maturity and cognitive 
and social abilities of the child in question, we have 
recognized that a typical four-year-old child “certainly has 
this ability” because he is “able to develop a certain routine 
and acquire a sense of environmental normalcy” and is “not 
only aware of those around him, but is able to form 
meaningful connections with the people and places he 
encounters each day.”  Id.  At that point, because the child has 
“reached an age where [he is] capable of becoming firmly 
rooted in a new country,” we attach greater significance to 
22 
 
acclimatization and give “less weight to shared parental 
intent.”  Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 296 (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 
1119 (9th Cir. 2004)).   
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2. The Parents’ Shared Intent In This 
Case 
 Here, the District Court declined to apply the 
presumption that there is, ordinarily, no change in habitual 
residence when the child’s move is for a “specific, limited 
duration” because it found that there was “no credible 
evidence” that the parties had an agreement that J.B.’s stay in 
Pittsburgh would be for a “specific duration.”  Blackledge, 
No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at *23-25 
(quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291 n.3).  We agree with 
Petitioner that this finding was clearly erroneous, given the 
evidence on this record that there was such an agreement.  
But because that evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates the 
parties intended J.B.’s residence in Pittsburgh, albeit of 
specific, limited duration, to carry “a degree of settled 
purpose,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549, we nonetheless conclude 
that the “shared parental intent” factor favors the United 
States as J.B.’s habitual residence.     
At the outset, we cannot agree with the District Court 
that there was no credible evidence that the parties had agreed 
J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh was intended to be for a specific 
duration.  While the Court acknowledged that the record 
demonstrated the “existence of an agreement,” it nonetheless 
found that it “does not speak to the specific terms of the 
agreement,” Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
114543, at *19, and therefore rejected the notion the stay 
could be categorized as of specific, limited duration.  But we 
have not required great precision in the terms of the 
agreement, nor even a specific return date, in order to 
conclude a case involved an agreed-upon move of “specific, 
limited duration.”  Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549.  Instead, we 
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have considered cases to fall in that category where the move 
was bounded by even a general time frame.  See Yang, 499 
F.3d at 272-73 (describing the child’s residence with the 
father, intended to be for the length of the mother’s 
recuperation, as “a limited period of time”); Whiting, 391 
F.3d at 542, 549 & n.6 (discussing the child’s stay with her 
mother for two years but “no later than October 19, 2003” as 
“intended to be for a specific, limited duration”); see also 
Feder, 63 F.3d at 223-24 (citing with approval In re Bates, 
No. CA 122-89, High Court of Justice, Family Div’l Ct. 
Royal Courts of Justice, U.K. (1989) (framing an 
approximately three-month stay with mother, while father 
was on a concert tour, as “for a limited period”)).   
Here, although the District Court was correct that the 
parties’ emails stop short of identifying a date certain that was 
originally agreed for J.B.’s return, or similarly “specific terms 
of the agreement,” Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 114543, at *19, they make clear that the parties 
intended J.B.’s stay in Pittsburgh to be of a “specific, limited 
duration,” Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549.  For example, in 
response to Petitioner’s references to the alleged “agreement” 
in his emails in February 2016, and his requests that 
Respondent “keep[] with [their] agreement that [J.B.] will 
return to [Petitioner] for the academic year 2016-2017,” J.A. 
190, Respondent did not reject the notion that there was an 
agreement or that J.B.’s stay with her in Pittsburgh was 
intended to be for a limited duration.  Rather, she asked 
Petitioner to “reconsider” the agreement, J.A. 172, so that J.B. 
could stay with her “as a primary caregiver,” J.A. 171, rather 
than requiring him to “yearly adapt[] to living” with a 
different parent in alternating years, which she believed 
would be “psychologically disadvantageous” for him, J.A. 
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177.  Indeed, the record is replete with references to the 
parties’ agreement that “[J.B.] would go with [Respondent] to 
Pitt[sburgh] and return to [Petitioner] for [the] 2016-2017 
academic year.  Then back to [Respondent].”  J.A. 176; see 
also J.A. 168 (warning Respondent to “prepare [herself] for 
fulfillment of [their] agreement that [J.B.] returns to 
[Petitioner] for 2016-2017” and reassuring her, “You’ll have 
him again in 2017”); J.A. 178 (noting that Respondent had 
not previously expressed concerns for J.B. to “spend alternate 
years with us when the agreement was made”).   
Notwithstanding such error, “we may affirm on any 
grounds supported by the record,” Maher Terminals, LLC v. 
Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 805 F.3d 98, 105 n.4 (3d Cir. 
2015), and “[w]hen the outcome is clear as a matter of law . . 
. remand is not necessary,” Mahmood v. Gonzales, 427 F.3d 
248, 253 (3d Cir. 2005).  Here, we conclude such an outcome 
is clear as a matter of law because this case is on all fours 
with our decision in Whiting v. Krassner, 391 F.3d 540 (3d 
Cir. 2004).  
In Whiting, the parents had agreed in writing, after the 
attack on the World Trade Center in New York City on 
September 11, 2001, that the mother and child would leave 
the United States and live in Canada for two years—i.e., for a 
limited duration.  391 F.3d at 542.  Two months into the 
move, however, the father changed his mind and removed the 
child to the United States.  Id. at 543.  As the child there was 
only sixteen months old, see id. at 542-43, we focused on 
shared parental intent, and not acclimatization, and we 
concluded that the child’s habitual residence was Canada, id. 
at 551-52.  After observing the parties intended for the mother 
and child, albeit for that specified period, to put down roots 
and take on the normal pattern of residential life in Canada, 
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including renting an apartment near the mother’s family 
members, looking into childcare programs, and applying for 
necessary documentation, such as a medical card, id. at 542, 
we concluded the move was accompanied by a “degree of 
settled purpose,” id. at 549.  Given that purpose, we observed, 
the fact that the mother and child’s Canadian residence was 
planned for two years “d[id] not in any way diminish the 
parties’ settled intention that the two were to remain in 
Canada for at least two years” and “in no way hinder[ed] the 
finding of a change in habitual residence.”  Id. at 550.  In 
reaching our holding, we also rejected the father’s argument 
that Canada could not have become the child’s habitual 
residence because there was no shared intent to abandon the 
United States, and we recognized that “abandonment,” as the 
flipside of “habitual residence,” could also be for “a definite 
and extended period,” i.e., until the child resumed her 
habitual residence in the abandoned country, as scheduled.7  
Id.  
In Whiting, we also relied heavily upon and cited 
approvingly to a British case that is even more analogous to 
J.B.’s case.  Id. at 547 (citing In re Bates, No. CA 122-89, 
High Court of Justice, Family Div’l Ct. Royal Courts of 
Justice, U.K. (1989)); see also Feder, 63 F.3d at 222-24 
(quoting In re Bates).  There, the father was a musician who 
                                              
7 In Whiting, we held that Canada had become the 
child’s habitual residence based only on the parties’ shared 
intent.  391 F.3d at 550-51.  Here, in contrast, not only the 
shared parental intent, but also acclimatization, favor the 
country of the custodial parent, see infra Part IV.B.3, making 
this an even stronger case for the United States as J.B.’s 
habitual residence.     
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travelled extensively, and the mother and child “had toured 
with father for the majority of the girl’s life to that point.”  
Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547 n.5.  Though London “was the 
family’s home base,” the parents decided that the mother and 
daughter would live in New York while the father toured the 
Far East, but after only two days, the father directed the 
nanny to bring the girl back to London.  Id.  The court 
reasoned that the accommodations made in New York to 
which father had agreed, “however acrimoniously,” for the 
three months before father “return[ed] to London amounted to 
a purpose with a sufficient degree of continuity to enable it 
properly to be described as settled.” Feder, 63 F.3d at 224 
(quoting In re Bates).  The child’s habitual residence, 
therefore, was New York.  Id. at 223-24 (citing In re Bates). 
Likewise, here, it is evident that J.B.’s move to the 
United States, although of limited duration, was intended by 
both Petitioner and Respondent to be accompanied by a 
degree of “settled purpose.”  Whiting, 391 F.3d at 550.  The 
record reflects that J.B. moved to Pittsburgh in August 2015 
for the purpose of assuming a full and normal life of an eight-
year-old boy during the intended period of his stay, making 
long-term friends and plans, developing routines and a sense 
of environmental normalcy, exploring his city and other parts 
of the Commonwealth, and putting down roots, not only for 
the 2015-2016 school year, but also, per the parents’ express 
agreement, for future alternating years, interspersed with the 
years he would be living with Petitioner in Germany.  Under 
these circumstances, as in Whiting, the fact that the parties 
understood that J.B. would return to Germany “d[id] not in 
any way diminish . . . the parties’ settled intention” that he 
was to remain in the United States for at least a year, settling 
into a normal routine, and the fact that J.B.’s stay was 
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intended to be of a limited duration “in no way hinder[ed]” a 
finding that the United States was his habitual residence 
during that time.  Id.   
 Petitioner disputes this interpretation of the record, 
arguing that this case more closely resembles that addressed 
by the Ninth Circuit in Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067 (9th 
Cir. 2001).  There the children, Israeli residents, traveled with 
their mother to the United States for a fifteen-month visit to 
“partake of American culture,” id. at 1069, in what the court 
analogized to a “study[] abroad” program, id. at 1083.  A year 
into that visit, however, the mother filed for divorce and 
retained the children in the United States.  Id. at 1069.  In 
rejecting the mother’s argument that the United States had 
become the children’s then-habitual residence, the Ninth 
Circuit concluded that, when the children moved to the 
United States, the “normal expectation,” shared by both the 
parents and the children, was that the family would reunite in 
their home in Israel and that Israel would, therefore, remain 
their habitual residence.  Id. at 1083.  As the court explained, 
the parents and the children were Israeli citizens; they had 
lived all their lives in Israel and entered the United States on a 
temporary visa; and neither parent had a prior connection to 
the United States.  Id. at 1069, 1082.   
 The record in J.B.’s case paints a very different 
picture.  Petitioner and Respondent did not intend J.B.’s stay 
in Pittsburgh as a “study[] abroad” program or a transient 
“American cultur[al]” visit.  Id. at 1069, 1083.  On the 
contrary, when Respondent and J.B. moved to the United 
States, J.B. was returning to a country and culture with which 
he was already familiar and a city in which he had previously 
lived for two years—a city that, by the time of the retention 
date, was the longest and most stable residence he had known 
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in his fairly nomadic early years; in addition to having 
extended family in the United States, J.B. was a United States 
citizen, as was his father, and his mother was a lawful 
permanent resident; Respondent and J.B. had resided in 
Germany for only two years between their two residences in 
Pittsburgh; within the first month of J.B.’s residence in 
Pittsburgh, his father made efforts to secure a job in the 
United States and elsewhere, indicating at one point that he 
felt “dirty” that J.B. might not have a home to return to in 
Germany at the end of that year, J.A. 200; at the time of the 
move, both Petitioner and Respondent recognized their 
marriage had become acrimonious, and according to 
Respondent, whom the District Court generally found more 
credible, the parties had agreed to divorce and it was only “a 
matter of time [as to] when,” J.A. 421-22; and the parents’ 
emails are explicit that they intended to continue living 
separately in future years and for J.B. to alternate between 
them, spending the 2015-2016 academic year in Pittsburgh, 
the 2016-2017 academic year in Germany, and the 2017-2018 
academic year back in Pittsburgh.  Thus, this is not a case, as 
in Mozes, where the noncustodial parent’s country had served 
to that point as their “home countr[y]” or where it can be said 
the “normal expectation” of the parties was that they would 
return to that country to live as a family unit.  See Mozes, 239 
F.3d at 1083.   
  Petitioner, argues, however, that we should disregard 
those portions of the parents’ communications reflecting that 
they had agreed that J.B. would “spend alternate years with 
[them] when the agreement was made,” J.A. 178, or that J.B. 
would be returning to Pittsburgh for the 2017-2018 school 
year, and that we should limit our consideration of the 
parents’ agreement to those excerpts in which they discuss 
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J.B.’s return to Germany for the 2016-2017 school year.  This 
we decline to do.  For as we have repeatedly recognized, the 
parents’ agreement as to the allocation of custody between 
them is highly relevant to the determination of “shared 
parental intent.”  See, e.g., Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 292-93, 
296-97; Whiting, 391 F.3d at 548-51.  After all, the main 
reason we look to “shared parental intent” as part of our 
inquiry is its likelihood “to color [the child’s] attitude to the 
contacts [he] is making” and to “affect the length of time 
necessary for a child to become habitually resident or 
otherwise influence a child’s ability to acclimatize”—factors 
relevant to the determination whether the move carried a 
“settled purpose ‘from the child’s perspective.’”  Karkkainen, 
445 F.3d at 292, 296.  For those reasons, where the parents 
have agreed, in connection with a child’s move to a given 
residence, that the child will henceforth split time between 
them, and, thus, is expected to return to that residence at 
regular intervals going forward, that shared parental intent 
will undoubtedly affect the child’s attitude, expectations, 
plans, and sense of purpose in undertaking the move to that 
residence.8 
                                              
8 The significance of the parents’ forward-looking 
intent in this circumstance is different than in those cases 
where courts have observed that the formation of an intention 
to move does not convert the intended future residence into a 
“habitual residence.”  See, e.g., Feder, 63 F.3d at 222 (citing 
Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396 (6th Cir. 1993) 
(holding that a mother’s intention to move the child to the 
United States did not make the United States the child’s 
habitual residence prior to the move)).  Where a child is 
actually living in a given residence, and we are tasked with 
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 Indeed, Mozes, by its terms, distinguished the “rare 
situation[s] where someone consistently splits time more or 
less evenly between two locations, so as to retain alternating 
habitual residences in each.”  239 F.3d at 1075 n.17 (citing 
Johnson v. Johnson, 493 S.E.2d 668 (Va. Ct. App. 1997)); see 
also id. at 1084 n.50 (explaining that where a child “spent 
regularly alternating periods with each parent . . . , [he] might 
thus have acquired dual habitual residence”).  And more 
recently the Ninth Circuit again observed in dictum that, 
where the child splits time between his parents’ countries of 
residence, he may be deemed to have “consecutive, 
alternative habitual residences” where supported by the facts.  
Valenzuela v. Michel, 736 F.3d 1173, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2013) 
(noting that the father also could have prevailed by showing 
that the father and the mother “shared a settled intention to 
abandon Mexico as the [children’s] sole habitual residence”).   
Likewise, the courts of other Hague Convention 
member states have consistently recognized that the existence 
of a so-called “shuttle custody” arrangement, in which a child 
splits time between his parents’ countries of residence, bears 
on the determination of habitual residence.  See, e.g., Wilson 
v. Huntley, 2005 Carswell Ont. 1606, at ¶¶ 8, 32, 50 (Can. 
Ont. Sup. Ct. J.) (WL) (holding that, where the child split her 
time in three-to-six month intervals between the mother and 
the father’s homes, developing “similar social and family 
bonds in each State,” and where the “parents clearly intended 
                                                                                                     
determining whether the move to it was accompanied by a 
settled purpose, the parents’ and child’s expectations that the 
child will return to that residence on a regular basis in the 
future is necessarily relevant to the child’s attitude regarding 
the move itself. 
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to share custody of [the child], in the legal sense and in the 
sense of physical, residential custody,” the child “could have 
consecutive alternative habitual residences in two different 
States at separate times”); J. v. J. [HFD] [Supreme 
Administrative Decision] 1995 case no. 7505-1995 (Swed.), 
translated at https://assets.hcch.net/incadat/fullcase/0080.htm 
(holding that, where the parents agreed to be responsible for 
the child “on an alternate basis” and to “share [the child’s] de 
facto care,” the child was habitually resident in her mother’s 
home country, where she was residing immediately prior to 
the retention, because the child had spent the last two years 
there and “ha[d] adjusted to circumstances in the place where 
she [wa]s living”).   
While we have observed in dictum that the concept of 
“alternating habitual residence” would appear to comport 
with the Hague Convention so long as “a child has only one 
habitual residence country at any given time,” Didon, 838 
F.3d at 322 n.20, we have not had prior occasion to address 
the relevance or weight of an agreement that a child split time 
between two parents.  In doing so now, we emphasize that the 
parents’ shared intent as to the custody arrangement between 
them is probative—but not dispositive—in the determination 
of habitual residence.  That is, we agree with the observation 
that “where residence with two parents is divided equally, 
it . . . [is] unreal, in the absence of other differentiating 
factors, to see the residence with one parent as primary and 
stays with the other parent as interruptions.”  Watson v. 
Jamieson, 1997 Fam. L.R. 11, 14 (Scot.).  At the same time, 
we eschew any suggestion that an agreement to alternate 
habitation between parents automatically equates to 
“alternating habitual residences.”  Indeed, any such 
categorical approach to shared custody or one-size-fits-all 
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framework for habitual residence would be inconsistent with 
our case law, which rejects the application of a 
“predetermined formula” to Hague Convention cases, 
Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 291, and with the Convention, which 
contemplates a fact-specific approach and encourages a 
“flexible interpretation” of its terms, Eliza Perez-Vera, 
Explanatory Report, in 3 Hague Conference on Private 
International Law, Acts and Documents of the Fourteenth 
Session, Child Abduction 426, 446 (1982).9   
Instead, we view a parental agreement that a child will 
split time between the parents’ countries of residence as a 
significant consideration, but as one among others, informing 
the “necessarily fact-intensive and circumstantially based” 
inquiry a court must undertake to determine whether a child’s 
move was accompanied by a “degree of settled purpose.”  
Whiting, 391 F.3d at 547-48.  Approaching the inquiry in this 
way, we respect both our precedent and Congress’s 
instruction that we pay heed to “the need for uniform 
international interpretation of the Convention.”  22 U.S.C. § 
9001(b)(3)(B).    
Undertaking that inquiry here, we consider, in addition 
to the other record evidence discussed above concerning the 
parents’ shared expectations for J.B.’s move to Pittsburgh in 
2015, the parents’ agreement that J.B. would “alternate 
between Germany and [the] USA” going forward, J.A. 157, 
                                              
9 As we previously recognized, “Elisa Perez-Vera was 
the official Hague Conference Reporter, and her report is 
generally recognized as the official history and commentary 
on the Convention.”  Whiting, 391 F.3d at 546 n.3 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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and, hence, that J.B. would be returning to Germany for only 
a single academic year before resuming his residence in 
Pittsburgh for the 2017-2018 year.   In view of that agreement 
and the totality of the record in this case, it is apparent that 
J.B.’s 2015 move to Pittsburgh was accompanied, through at 
least the July 6, 2016 retention date, by the requisite “degree 
of settled purpose” and that the element of shared parental 
intent thus supports the United States as J.B.’s then-habitual 
residence.10  Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549. 
3. The Record Concerning J.B.’s 
Acclimatization 
Petitioner asserts two points of error on 
acclimatization, arguing that the District Court applied the 
wrong retention date and, therefore, improperly considered 
irrelevant evidence of acclimatization, and that, when the 
record is limited to the proper time frame, it does not support 
a finding of acclimatization.  While we agree that the District 
Court mistakenly considered post-retention-date evidence, we 
                                              
10 Petitioner’s argument that J.B. was expected to 
return to Germany after the year in Pittsburgh is thus beside 
the point.  Although Petitioner accurately catalogues the 
evidence supporting that expectation—e.g., the letter to J.B.’s 
school requesting a one-year leave of absence and stating that 
J.B. would return for the 2016-2017 academic year; the three-
year German visas the parties and J.B. obtained before the 
Respondent and J.B. left the country; and that J.B. left some 
of his belongings behind in Germany—that evidence is 
entirely consistent with the parties’ agreement that J.B. was to 
spend alternating years with each parent and that, during his 
year in Pittsburgh, the United States was J.B.’s habitual 
residence.   
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have no trouble concluding that error was harmless given the 
substantial record concerning acclimatization as of the correct 
retention date.  See generally Winston ex rel. Winston v. 
Children & Youth Servs. of Del. Cty., 948 F.2d 1380, 1391 
n.7 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding that the court’s consideration of 
inadmissible hearsay was harmless error where there was 
“sufficient evidence without [the improperly admitted 
evidence] to support the district court’s conclusion”).   
The evidence of J.B.’s acclimatization to Pittsburgh as 
of July 6, 2016 is overwhelming.  He had a tremendously 
successful academic year, earning nearly all As and 
overcoming an initial reading deficiency while demonstrating 
“dramatic improvement” over the year.  J.A. 329, 333, 451.  
In addition, J.B. made friends “easily” and was, according to 
his teacher, “well-adjusted” overall.  J.A. 330, 334.  J.B. also 
enjoyed numerous activities outside of school, including 
soccer, swim team, and a robotics club, which he was 
handpicked to join by a fellow classmate.  Over the course of 
the year, J.B. learned how to successfully program a robot to 
complete missions, despite feeling as though the task was 
impossible when he first started.  And on his swim team J.B. 
mastered each of the competitive strokes, and was competing 
by the end of the year, looking forward to stepping up into the 
next group the following year.   
The record, likewise, reflects that J.B. was sufficiently 
mature to form “meaningful connections with the people and 
places he encounter[ed]” in Pittsburgh.  Whiting, 391 F.3d at 
550-51.  In a credibility determination, to which we defer 
absent clear error, Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455, 1468 
(2017), the District Court found that J.B. “exhibit[ed] an 
unusual degree of maturity and situational awareness,” and 
therefore accorded “significant weight” to J.B.’s statements 
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that he was looking forward long-term to moving into a house 
and getting a dog in Pittsburgh, that he understood “his place 
in Pittsburgh,” that he preferred living in Pittsburgh over 
Berlin because of his quality of life in the United States and 
because he had “more and better friends in Pittsburgh.”11  
Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at 
*12 n.6, 14-15.  The in camera interview thus further 
supports the District Court’s conclusion, based on the record 
as a whole, that J.B. had “formed meaningful connections 
with the people and places he encountered,” id. at *16 
(quoting Karkkainen, 445 F.3d at 294 (brackets omitted)), and 
“ha[d] attained a sufficient degree of continuity to be properly 
described as settled,” id. (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Yang, 499 F.3d at 273). 
While Petitioner argues the District Court relied 
heavily on evidence of activities post-dating the July 6 
retention date, that evidence, on inspection, reduces to three 
minor points of testimony:  J.B.’s swim team that ran from 
September 2015 through the end of July 2016, a summer 
reading challenge that ran from May 24 through August 31, 
and J.B.’s summer camps.  Petitioner argues that any 
consideration of these activities constituted reversible error, 
                                              
11 We consider J.B.’s preference for Pittsburgh here 
because a child’s expressed preference for a country may, 
considering his age and maturity, be a further indication that 
the child has acclimatized to that country, see Karkkainen, 
445 F.3d at 294-95, regardless of whether that preference as 
stated would satisfy the “wishes of the child” defense or 
exception outlined in the Hague Convention, see Yang, 499 
F.3d at 278 (citing Hague Convention, supra, art. 13). 
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but we are not persuaded that the District Court erred, much 
less that such error was prejudicial.12  For example, while the 
reading challenge extended through August 31, J.B. 
completed it on July 5, prior to the retention date.  And while 
J.B.’s participation on the swim team carried over through the 
end of July, the testimony related to J.B.’s involvement dating 
back to September 2015, with no mention of specific events 
between July 6 and July 31.  Even the evidence regarding 
summer camps is relevant to the extent it informed J.B.’s 
expectations and aspirations before July 6.  Moreover, any 
error in the District Court’s consideration of this evidence 
was harmless because the post-retention-date activities were 
merely duplicative and cumulative of other evidence in the 
record concerning those same activities.  See Howmet 
Aluminum Corp. v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 665 
F.2d 476, 478 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 61) 
(holding that consideration of inadmissible evidence that is 
merely cumulative of properly admitted evidence is not 
grounds for remand or reversal). 
In sum, given the extensive record evidence of J.B.’s 
success in school, his participation in various activities and 
sports, his many friendships, his experiences at cultural, 
entertainment, and sporting events, and his own stated 
preference for the United States, to which the District Court 
afforded “significant weight” because of “the degree of 
                                              
12 Because we conclude that any error in considering 
evidence beyond July 6 was harmless, we need not address 
the Respondent’s argument that the Petitioner waived his 
objections to the District Court’s consideration of it because 
he failed to preserve such objections at various points in the 
proceedings.   
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maturity and situational awareness” J.B. exhibited, 
Blackledge, No. 16-1004, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114543, at 
*12 n.6, the District Court did not clearly err in its fact-
finding related to J.B.’s acclimatization, nor did it commit 
legal error in its determination that J.B. was acclimatized to 
the United States at the time of retention. 
V. Conclusion 
 Because the parents’ shared intent was for J.B. to 
move to the United States with a “degree of settled purpose,” 
Whiting, 391 F.3d at 549, and because J.B. had acclimatized 
to the United States by the date of retention, we agree with 
the District Court’s holding that the United States was J.B.’s 
habitual residence immediately prior to the retention date and 
that the retention therefore was not wrongful under the Hague 
Convention.  Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court.    
